Do Silesians Exist and can Silesia be Autonomous? Limits of ethno-political tolerance in Poland by BUCHOWSKI, Michał & CHLEWIŃSKA, Katarzyna
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES 
Do Silesians Exist and can Silesia be 
Autonomous?  
Limits of Ethno-Political Tolerance in Poland 
 
Michał Buchowski 
Katarzyna Chlewińska 
 
Adam Mickiewicz University of Poznań 
 
 
2012/15 
4. National Case Studies - Political Life 
Final Country Reports 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE 
ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES 
Do Silesians Exist and Silesia be Autonomous? 
Limits of Ethno-Political Tolerance in Poland 
 
PROF. MICHAŁ BUCHOWSKI 
KATARZYNA CHLEWIŃSKA 
ADAM MICKIEWICZ UNIVERSITY 
 
 
 
Work Package 4 – National Case Studies of 
Challenges to Tolerance in Political Life 
 
D4.1 Final Country Reports on Concepts and 
Practices of Tolerance Addressing Cultural Diversity 
in Political Life 
 
 
  
 © 2012 Michał Buchowski & Katarzyna Chlewińska 
 
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other 
purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). 
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
research project, the year and the publisher. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Published by the European University Institute 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Via dei Roccettini 9 
50014 San Domenico di Fiesole - Italy 
 
ACCEPT PLURALISM Research Project,  
Tolerance, Pluralism and Social Cohesion:  
Responding to the Challenges of the 21
st
 Century in Europe  
European Commission, DG Research 
Seventh Framework Programme  
Social Sciences and Humanities 
grant agreement no. 243837 
 
 
www.accept-pluralism.eu 
www.eui.eu/RSCAS/ 
 
 
 
 
Available from the EUI institutional repository CADMUS 
cadmus.eui.eu 
  
 
Tolerance, Pluralism and Social Cohesion: Responding to the Challenges of the 21st Century in 
Europe (ACCEPT PLURALISM) 
 
ACCEPT PLURALISM is a Research Project, funded by the European Commission under the 
Seventh Framework Program. The project investigates whether European societies have become more 
or less tolerant during the past 20 years. In particular, the project aims to clarify: (a) how is tolerance 
defined conceptually, (b) how it is codified in norms, institutional arrangements, public policies and 
social practices, (c) how tolerance can be measured (whose tolerance, who is tolerated, and what if 
degrees of tolerance vary with reference to different minority groups). The ACCEPT PLURALISM 
consortium conducts original empirical research on key issues in school life and in politics that 
thematise different understandings and practices of tolerance. Bringing together empirical and 
theoretical findings, ACCEPT PLURALISM generates a State of the Art Report on Tolerance and 
Cultural Diversity in Europe, a Handbook on Ideas of Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe, a 
Tolerance Indicators’ Toolkit where qualitative and quantitative indicators may be used to score each 
country’s performance on tolerating cultural diversity, and several academic publications (books, 
journal articles) on Tolerance, Pluralism and Cultural Diversity in Europe. The ACCEPT 
PLULARISM consortium is formed by 18 partner institutions covering 15 EU countries. The project 
is hosted by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and co-ordinated by Prof. Anna 
Triandafyllidou. 
 
The EUI, the RSCAS and the European Commission are not responsible for the opinion expressed by 
the author(s). 
 
Adam Mickiewicz University of Poznań is one of the largest academic centres in Poland. The 
University employs nearly 3,000 teaching staff and serves 50,000 students in 14 faculties offering BA, 
MA and PhD programmes. Students can choose from 190 majors. AMU cooperates with over 100 
partner universities abroad. Department of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology is one of the leading 
anthropological institution in the region that offers specialised courses on identity, ethnicity, 
migration, multiculturalism and cultural critique.  
Michal Buchowski is a Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Poznań and of 
Comparative Central European Studies at European University Viadrina in Frankfurt/Oder. 
He also lectured as a Visiting Professor at Rutgers University and Columbia University. His 
scientific interest is in Central European postsocialist cultural and social transformations as 
well as ethnicity and migration. Currently he serves as a Head of the Department of 
Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology in Poznań, President of the European Association of 
Social Anthropologists and vice-Chair of World Council of Anthropological Associations. 
Katarzyna Chlewińska is a PhD student in the Department of Ethnology and Cultural 
Anthropology at AMU. She works on tolerance towards minorities, including sexual ones. 
 
Contact details: 
Michał Buchowski & Katarzyna Chlewińska 
Department of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology 
Adam Mickiewicz University 
ul. Św. Marcin 78 
61-809 Poznań, Poland  
Fax: + 48- 61 829 4710 4685 770 
E-mail: mbuch@amu.edu.pl & kacha@amu.edu.pl 
http://etnologia.amu.edu.pl/go.live.php 
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/  and www.annatriandafyllidou.com  
For more information on the Socio Economic Sciences and Humanities Programme in FP7 see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/index_en.htm  
http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/cooperation/socio-economic_en.html 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................ 2 
Keywords ................................................................................................................................................ 4 
1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 5 
2. The place of minorities in Polish society. A historical perspective ................................................. 5 
2.1 Census of  2011 ....................................................................................................................... 8 
3. Silesia ............................................................................................................................................ 10 
3.1 The Silesians.......................................................................................................................... 11 
3.2. A minority or a regional group? ................................................................................................. 12 
4. Methodology of the study .............................................................................................................. 14 
5. Silesian Autonomy – the political challenge ................................................................................. 15 
5.1 Relevance of the case study ................................................................................................... 16 
5.2 Setting the Scene ................................................................................................................... 16 
6.  The Silesians as the ‘camouflaged German option’ ......................................................................... 17 
6.1.  The Association of People of Silesian Nationality .................................................................... 19 
7. Thematic analysis .............................................................................................................................. 21 
7.1.  Silesian identity in dispute – ‘Silesian harm’ or ‘The Great Silesia’? ....................................... 22 
7.2. Republic vs. Nation - what is radical about RAS? ..................................................................... 24 
7.3.  The Silesian Autonomy Movement & Silesians in public space ............................................... 26 
8. Conclusions ....................................................................................................................................... 27 
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 29 
Anex I .................................................................................................................................................... 34 
Anex II................................................................................................................................................... 34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Executive Summary 
The report ‘Do Silesians Exist and Silesia be Autonomous? Limits of Ethno-Political 
Tolerance in Poland’, presents the case of the Silesian Autonomy Movement (Ruch Autonomii Śląska, 
hereafter RAS), its participation in political life at a regional level, and the efforts in promoting 
regionalism as well as the idea of a Silesian nation. RAS is an organisation of an educational, cultural 
and political profile fighting for the restoration of Upper Silesia’s political autonomy on the grounds 
of its specific borderland status and a history of autonomy granted to Silesia in the interwar period, 
and supporting Silesian identity-building.  
This case study was inspired by controversies around Silesians and RAS caused by The Report on the 
State of the Republic published by the major right-wing party Law and Justice (Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwość – hereafter PIS). The document is a list of charges against the ruling party, Platforma 
Obywatelska (Civic Platform, hereafter PO). The right-wing rhetoric of the oppressed nation and the 
threat of Polish unity used in the report was a tool used for discrediting PO. The Report… accuses the 
ruling party of a lack of patriotism and of indifference to a progressing degeneration of national 
identity. The statement that triggered a heated country-wide debate and immediate reactions in the 
circles of Silesian activists (mainly RAS activists and politicians), the German minority and other 
minority communities is a short passage expounding a view that ‘Silesianness’ (Silesian identity) is a 
‘camouflaged  German option’, i.e. connecting Silesian organisations promoting autonomy and the 
strengthening of Silesian cultural identity with some kind of an anti-Polish ideology, without even 
attempting to explain this notion and casual link.  
After this strictly political debate stopped, the controversies around Silesia and Silesians have brought 
one remarkable and unexpected outcome, i.e. a revival of interest in ‘Silesianness’, Silesians’ national 
existence, rights and identity. Many people in the region have apparently re-invented themselves as 
members of the ‘Silesian nation’. 
In contrast to most other European countries, national and ethnic minorities in Poland are numerically 
insignificant; the result of the 2002 Census showed that, already then, Silesians were by far the largest 
declared minority (173 000), followed by Germans (153 000). Migrant communities are small and 
practically absent in political life. However, this largest declared minority group is not recognised by 
the state neither as a national, nor as an ethnic minority. Silesians are politically active, have their 
organisations and leaders, and are present in public discourses. All this makes Silesians particularly 
interesting in terms of the issue of the tolerance of diversity in political life.  
The latest Census (carried out in 2011) confirmed the fact that Poland is, at least in comparison to 
many other European states, ethnically homogenous, and over 91% of the population declare Polish 
national identity (36 007 000). The most numerous minority identities are: Silesian (809 000), 
Kashubian (212 000) and German (109 000). These results confirmed previous ones, but the 
significant changes in the numbers surprised even Silesian activists. More than two decades after 
democratic change, it seems that the growing involvement of minority activists in the efforts to 
promote a minority identity and the increasing visibility of ‘non-traditional’ minorities’ in public life 
have brought astounding effects. 
The case of RAS, Silesians and their political and cultural status has been constantly discussed in 
Polish public debates since the 1990s, often in relation to contemporary political challenges. It serves  
as an example of post-transformational tensions between the policy and practice of national unity and 
the grassroots efforts of people in some regions to change the dominant cultural schemata. In the 
centralised Polish state, any challenge to undermine this kind of monolithic socio-political setup, 
which at the same time is permeated by the image of a homogenous Polish nation, any claim to 
recognise not only minority rights, but also the possibility to exercise them, is often interpreted as 
dangerous and as undermining nation-state integrity. Attempts at implementing constitutionally 
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granted entitlements to cultural visibility and the execution of civic rights are perceived either as 
unsubstantiated and unnecessary demands of an insignificant number of people, or as a result of the 
overambitious goals of some activists that manipulate history and people. They are presented as 
presenting a threat to homogeneous society.  
This case study shows, on the one hand, how the opportunities offered as a result Poland’s 
participation in the structures of the European Union (especially European support for regional 
movements and  minority organisations) are actually used by local activists and minority 
organisations, and, on the other hand, how they are interpreted within the mainstream political debate. 
The attacks on RAS illustrate strong universalising tendencies and unifying themes present in the 
rhetoric of the nationalistically minded segments of the society and rightist politicians, who have used 
the case to weaken the ruling coalition and frequently use it as an argument against political 
opponents. In short, it illustrates how the issue of basic civil rights can be a hostage of political 
stalemate as well as how it may unveil the structural mechanisms of political life. 
This report, focusing on RAS’s reception and rejection, raises issue of the limits of tolerance in 
political life in Poland in the sphere of the political representation of minorities, and it shows the 
boundary-drawing process in the political life of the country. 
The report is based on secondary sources (scientific literature on Silesia and Silesians, documents, 
reports and expert documents on minorities and their political participation in Poland, on articles in 
newspapers commenting on the ‘camouflaged German option’ controversy), as well as primary data 
(interviews) concerning the political activity of RAS. The secondary sources are to a large extent 
Internet sources – web sites, forums and comments. The interviews were conducted in January and 
February 2012. Four semi-structured, very long (2 hours each) qualitative interviews with RAS leaders 
and members in the two main cities of Silesia – Katowice and Opole – were conducted. In the 
interpretation of the materials the method of  thematic analysis was applied.  
The analysis attempts to answer the questions about the limits of ethno-political tolerance in Poland: 
(1) What kind of groups and claims can be tolerated in political life? (2) On what terms can these 
groups express their difference and fight for their civic rights? (3)  And, what cannot be tolerated in 
public/political life in Poland? In the course of the so-called thematic analysis we identify three major 
themes and apply discursive means by which we try to answer these three questions.  
The analysis revealed that there is a limited access of minorities to public debates and their political 
participation is restricted; it demonstrates a general lack of support extended to minorities in their 
efforts to participate in public life as equal partners (e.g., the accusation that RAS abuses preferential 
democratic rules designed to promote actual ethnic minorities, such as Germans). This situation can be 
classified as a lack of acceptance and recognition of the minorities in the political sphere. This applies 
both to the marginalisation of recognised minorities (there is a formal possibility of participation in 
political life), and the paradox of Silesians – the largest, unrecognised minority accused of the treason 
of Polishness. 
There is a lack of tolerance at the state level and a partial tolerance at the local level towards the 
identity-based activity of Silesians and its political manifestations. However, the support for RAS in 
the region is relatively narrow, which supports our thesis from our previous studies (Buchowski and 
Chlewińska 2010; 2011) that Polish society conceives itself as a homogeneous ethnic entity, a unified 
and integral nation. Public discourse favours patriotic and national perspectives and there is no room 
for the equal participation of minorities in public life, or, at least, any leeway is constricted for them 
and it is defined by the dominant majority.  
However, all this does not mean that there is no hope for change in this area. Due to their growing 
effectiveness, modern activity strategies applied by RAS are emulated by other political forces in the 
region and elswhere. Silesians are increasingly regarded as a social force that cannot be longer 
ignored; for instance, RAS activists participate in the ruling coalition at the regional level and 
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Silesians’ representatives  got invited to the parliamentary committee on minorities, which indicates a 
change in the politicians’ approach to the phenomenon of ‘Silesianness’). It may happen that the 
Silesians will pluralise Polish political life without necessarily achieving their own goals.  
 
Keywords 
 
Silesia, Silesian Autonomy Movement, tolerance in political life, unrecognised minority
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1. Introduction 
This case study in the area of political life will cover the nation-wide discussion on the emergence and 
activity of Ruch Autonomii Śląska, the Silesian Autonomy Movement (hereafter RAS) – a regional 
organisation of an educational, cultural and political profile struggling for the restoration of Upper 
Silesia’s regional autonomy based on historical grounds (being a borderland region, attempts at 
creating an independent polity immediately after WWI and an autonomy in the interwar period). The 
study presents Silesia and Silesians as part of contemporary Poland, and its socio-cultural 
characteristics with respect to tolerance and the participation of minorities in the democratic process. 
This goal will be achieved through the identification of arguments advanced by  mostly nationalist 
politicians and activists in response to various actions and initiatives undertaken by Silesian 
organisations and associations promoting regionalism and highlighting the diversity of ethnic minority 
cultures. 
A democratic set up of the country enables RAS  to function in the political sphere and the movement 
has to be tolerated also by advocates of a centralised model of politics and a unitary concept of the 
nation. RAS, an officially registered organisation, has a clearly defined political aim of creating an 
autonomous region in the centralised state and is strongly engaged in regional politics. In 2011, it 
attracted so many voters in local elections that  it was invited to join the coalition of ruling parties in 
the Górny Śląsk, the Upper Silesia voivodship’s parliament1. This electoral success and the coalition 
with the local branches of the parties currently ruling nationwide, the Civic Platform (Platforma 
Obywatelska) and the Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe), stirred discussions about 
the administrative and political constitution of the Polish state, the ethnic character of the ‘nation’ , 
and, last but not least, the parameters of democracy and tolerance. Arguments, opinions and discourses 
persistently refer to the turbulent past, but are voiced today in a profoundly different political setting – 
a constitutional democracy meeting all standards of the European Union.  
2. The place of minorities in Polish society. A historical perspective 
In ethnic terms, Poland is one of the least diversified societies in Europe. The historical 
Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania (14
th
 to 18
th
 centuries) was diversified ethnically, 
linguistically and  religiously, and it hosted various ethnic and religious minorities on its territory.  
Due to its religious composition it had to acknowledge the coexistence of Catholics and the Orthodox; 
personal freedoms granted to nobles caused Protestantism to be  practiced widely. Jews and other 
religious ‘heretics’ were allowed to settle and practice their faith, however, not to proselytise. One can 
say that it was a very tolerant regime surrounded by mostly intolerant European monarchies The 
Commonwealth was an example of something that Michael Walzer (1997) calls ‘an imperial regime of 
tolerance.’ This historically shaped diversity was still visible in the first half of the 20th century. In the 
so-called Second Republic reborn after WWI, both religious and ethnic minorities comprised about 
one third of the society. Only after WWII, due to the extermination of Jews carried out by Germans, 
border changes, and the ‘resettlement of populations’ to and from the victorious Soviet Union and 
defeated Germany, Poland became virtually ethnically (Poles) and religiously (Roman-Catholics) 
homogeneous. The aim of creating a uniform nation was a policy exercised by the communists and 
                                                     
1 Poland is divided into 16 administrative units called województwa (voivodships). In each vovodship there are offices of 
wojewoda, i.e the voivodship administrator that represents the central government, and of marszałek (marshal), who is 
appointed by locally elected representatives to the local parliament called sejmik (the nationwide Parliament is called Sejm). 
Voivodships have their budgets, and a certain amount of power and competences that, in a complex way, are divided between 
wojewoda and sejmik with its marszałek. However, this kind of decentralisation does not change the fact that the country’s 
basic political constitution remains centralised.  
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supported by the majority of the population (Buchowski and Chlewińska 2010). 
Until 1989 minority issues barely existed due to their size and the communist authorities’ strategy of 
‘hiding problems’. From time to time, communists used the tactics of divide et impera in order to 
achieve their own political aims. The Communist Constitution granted non-discrimination, but  in 
practice, minorities could only nurture their traditions using state-controlled ‘cultural associations’. 
Ethnic issues were perceived as threatening state interests, and, therefore, were strictly controlled and 
not pronounced. It seems that this mode of thinking lingers in some right-wing political circles  to the 
present day, although its contemporary advocates refer rather to nationalistic historical traditions and 
thinkers. After 1989, minorities started to establish their own associations and, since then,  they can 
benefit from the freedom of speech (Buchowski and Chlewińska 2010; Pędziwiatr 2009). Both the will 
to democratise the political order and EU demands  pressed policy makers to accept liberal laws 
concerning religious freedoms as well as ethnic and national minorities’ presence in the public sphere. 
For instance, the 1991 Treaty with Germany granted political rights to Germans who have self-
organised themselves into several associations which represent hundreds of thousands citizens 
(estimations vary between one- and three-hundred). Election rules favourable to ethnic minorities 
(‘ethnic’ organisations’ candidates do not have to meet the requirement of crossing a 5% threshold of 
votes nationwide in order to be elected to the parliament) and the German minority’s concentration in 
the Opole region, have enabled them  to be represented by MPs in the Sejm, the lower chamber of the 
Parliament (Kijonka 2004: 39). 
The history of political changes after 1989 with regard to minorities and their participation in political 
life can  be divided into two periods: (1) massive democratic changes (1989-2004), and (2) the EU 
accession in May 2004, as well as the acceptance of a new law on national, ethnic and linguistic 
minorities,  introduced into practice in 2004/5.   
Political liberalisation has encouraged minorities to become visible, but not all attempts are welcomed 
by significant parts of the majority society. Numbers are important in this context. Before the National 
Census of  2002, experts estimated that historically-settled ethnic minorities in Poland could amount to 
800 000 to 1 600 000, i.e. between 2% and  4% of the general population . To the astonishment of 
scholars and minorities, only 471 500 (1.23%) of the population declared  an ethnicity different than 
Polish . Interestingly, 774 855 persons (2.03%) did not declare any nationality, and 4 277 are listed 
under the category of ‘Polish-undetermined’ (GUS 2002). 
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Table 1: Main national and ethnic minorities in Poland and immigrant populations (2002) 
 
Silesian 173 153 0,45 % 37 % Minority not recognized by 
the state 
German 152 897 0,39 % 32 % National minority 
Belarussian 48 737 0,13 % 10 % National minority 
Ukrainian 30 957 0,08 % 6,5 % National minority 
Roma 12 855 0,03 % 2,7 % Ethnic minority 
Russian 6 103 0,016 % 1,3 % National minority 
Lemko 5 863 0,015 % 1,2 % Ethnic minority 
Lithuanian 5 846 0,015 % 1,2 % National minority 
Kashubian 5 062 0,013 % 1 % Group using regional 
language, not recognized by 
the state as a distinct minority 
Slovak 2 001 0,005 % 0,4 % National minority 
Vietnamese 1 808 0,004 % 0,3 % Migrant population 
French 1 633 0,004 % 0,3 % Migrant population 
American 1 541 0,004 % 0,3 % Migrant population 
Greek 1 404 0,003 % 0,2 % Migrant population 
Italian 1 367 0,003 % 0,2 % Migrant population 
Jewish 1 133 0,002 % 0,2 % National minority 
Bulgarian 1 112 0,002 % 0,2 % Migrant population 
Armenian 1 082 0,002 % 0,2 % National minority 
Czech 831 0,002 % 0,1 % National minority 
English 800 0,002 % 0,1 % Migrant population 
Source: National Census of 2002. 
 
The Act on Minorities from 2005 makes a distinction between ethnic minorities and national 
minorities. A national minority is a group: a) less numerous than the rest of the state’s inhabitants; b) 
differentiated by language, culture or tradition and aiming to maintain the differentiation; c) 
possessing the consciousness of a historical national community; d) inhabiting Polish territory for at 
least 100 years; e) and identifying with the nation organized in a state. An ethnic minority shares with 
the national minority all of its features, except for the last criterion. This division is objected  by some 
ethnic minorities’ activists (e.g. the Polish Tatar Association and the Federation of Roma in Poland) 
who claim that it is discriminatory. Kazimierz Kutz, a deputy from Silesia, protested against the 
definition of minority groups adopted in the Act... during the final voting on it, but his voice could not 
change the outcome (Sekuła 2009: 405). As a result, Poland has adopted a rather old-fashioned 
definition of minority groups, based on the argument of historical presence arbitrarily defined (100 
years), which causes many misunderstandings in the relations between policy makers and minority 
Michał Buchowski & Katarzyna Chlewińska 
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representatives.  
Three conclusions that are relevant for the current argument can be drawn from this data from 2002: 
(1) in comparison to most other European countries, national and ethnic minorities in Poland are 
numerically insignificant; Silesians are by far the largest declared minority, followed by Germans, and 
their number is more than three times larger than the third group on the list; (2) migrant communities 
are small if not miniscule and – it should be added already at this point – they are practically absent in 
political life; (3) the largest minority group declared is not recognised neither as national nor ethnic 
minority. Meanwhile, they are politically active, have their organisations and leaders, and they are 
(relatively) present in public discourses. All this makes Silesians particularly interesting in terms of 
the issues addressed in the comparative study on the democratic participation of minorities. As all 
Polish citizens, Silesians use their right to organise themselves, however, this is paradox that Silesians 
are not recognised by the authorities as a minority, which they claim they are. 
2.1 Census of  2011 
The institution responsible for conducting the Census in 2011 – the Central Statistical Office (Główny 
Urząd Statystyczny (hereafter GUS) –  has for ‘technical’ reasons delayed  the announcement of even 
the preliminary 2011 Census results (GUS 2012). Many demographers and sociologists immediately 
criticised the manner in which the data were collected  and the results presented.
2
  
The main controversy was prompted by the data on the ethno-national identification of the population. 
The Census confirmed the fact that Poland, in relation to most other European countries, is ethnically  
homogenous – over 91% of the people declared Polish national identity (36 007 000). The most 
numerous minority identities declared were: Silesian (809 000), Kashubian (212 000) and German 
(109 000). One should add that 1.862 million of the people asked remain ‘unspecified.’ Silesians have 
emerged again as the largest minority. The size of this group astounded demographers, journalists and 
inhabitants of Silesia equally .
3
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
2 For instance see: 
http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114883,11617131,Naukowcy_skrytykowali_GUS_za_spis.html?lokale=rzeszow 
3 http://www.dziennikzachodni.pl/artykul/537179,wielki-dzien-konca-dupowatosci-slazakow,id,t.html 
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Tab. 2. Declared ethno-national identifications of population inhabiting Poland (2011) 
Identification 
(ethnic or 
national) 
Primary 
identification 
declared in the 
first question 
 Secondary 
identification 
(declared in the 
second question) 
Total 
Primary 
identification as 
the only one 
(primary and 
secondary 
identification) 
Together  
with Polish 
identification 
 
In thousands 
Total 38 501  35 767  871  38 501  x  
Polish  36 007  35 251  78  36 085  x  
Other than Polish  632  516  793  1 388  834  
Silesian  418  362  391  809  415  
Kashubian 17  16  211  228  212  
German  49  26  61  109  52  
Ukrainian 36  26  12  48  20  
Belarussian  37  31  10  47  15  
Roma  12  9  4  16  6  
Russian  8  5  5  13  7  
American  1  1  10  11  10  
Lemko  7  5  3  10  3  
English  2  1  8  10  8  
Not specified  1 862  x  x  1 862  x  
Source: GUS 2012 
 
How can this more-than-fourfold increase in the number of people declaring Silesian identity be 
explained? This upsurge cannot be justified by rapid demographic expansion of the population, 
because it is definitely not the case in a country with the birth rate at the level of 1.3
4
, and the data for 
the region in question are not significantly different. The other hypothesis is that in 2002, people were 
still hesitant to declare a nationality other than Polish due to their fear of intolerance inherited from the 
communist past, and hid their identity in a mono-ethnic state, or were manipulated by the interviewers 
(Robotycki 2010: 82; Warmińska 2009: 37). This claim can be undermined by the counterargument 
that, now, more than two decades after democratic change many do not share these fears and they 
clearly understood the questions about their nationality. It seems that this increase is primarily a result 
of the growing involvement of minority activists in efforts to promote minority identity and the 
increasing visibility of these ‘non-traditional’ minorities5, i.e. Silesians and Kashubians (the latter 
living in Pomerania, nearby Gdańsk), in public life. At the same time, cultural and political 
organisations express grass-root feelings. These efforts create a space for formulating demands to 
obtain more civic rights and to strengthen the minority’s position in dealings with the state. This is 
particularly important in the case of Silesians, as their ethnic distinction has not been accepted. 
Despite this rejection,  their status of a partner in the dispute on the issue had to be acknowledged. As, 
for instance, one of our interviewees said, the representatives of Silesian cultural organisations got an 
                                                     
4 http://www.indexmundi.com/poland/total_fertility_rate.html 
5 By ‘non-traditional minorities’ we understand self-declared minorities that have been not treated as such in the existing 
scholarly literature and are not recognised as such by the state authorities. We discuss this issue in more detail below. 
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invitation to a meeting of the Parliamentary Commission for Minorities in early 2012 [P.D.].  This 
simple fact shows the awareness of the policy makers of the existence of  the problem of Silesians, and 
it puts into question the definitions of national and ethnic minorities which so far had been accepted. It 
also requires the inclusion of Silesians in the political discourse. 
3. Silesia 
Silesia is a historical region located in Central Europe, stretching through two contemporary states: 
Poland and the Czech Republic. The Polish part of the province is divided into Lower and Upper 
Silesia, with the Opole (Oppeln) voivodship sandwiched in between  them. The historical capital of  
Silesia was Wrocław, located in Lower Silesia, now the capital of the voivodship, populated mostly by 
post-war settlers from former Eastern Poland as well as  people from Central Poland. Today, the name 
‘Silesia’ is often mistakenly associated only with Upper Silesia, a heavily industrial and densely 
populated  (4.635 million people, 12.4% of the whole country’s population in 20106) region of  the 
Katowice agglomeration. This report relates specifically to the situation in Upper Silesia where the 
descendants of the interwar inhabitants comprise a significant part of the population. 
Map 1. Silesia 
 
             Source: eurominority.eu                                  
                                                     
6 http://www.slaskie.pl/strona_n.php?jezyk=pl&grupa=3&dzi=1251196416&id_menu=284 
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3.1 The Silesians 
Poland  is by political standards a modern western-type democracy. In the preamble to the Polish  
constitution, which was accepted in a referendum  in 1997, one encounters an ambiguous definition of 
a nation: ‘We, the Polish Nation - all citizens of the Republic.’ This formula can be understood as a 
compromise between an ethnic and civic perception of a nation (Zubrzycki 2001). Compared to many 
other Central and Eastern European constitutions, it at least acknowledges the existence of non-titular 
citizens and their belonging to the nation understood in the English sense of the word. The law 
regarding minorities, besides the above-mentioned distinction between national minorities and ethnic 
minorities, also introduces the category of linguistic minorities (Buchowski and Chleiwńska 2010). 
Again, Silesians are not accorded this status, in contrast to the Kashubians. For the Polish authorities, 
scholars and  lawmakers, Silesians are part of the Polish nation and their language comprises merely a 
dialect of Polish.  
The unofficial presence, and at  the same time, public visibility of this group creates a conundrum. 
Scholars ask how to explain the phenomenon of a nation that is denied its history and existence? 
Several emotional debates and academic conferences on the  issue were held (see: Nijakowski 2004a; 
Pędziwiatr 2009). Lawyers also face a dilemma, and neither the Polish Supreme Court, nor the 
European Court in Strasbourg accorded Silesians the right to be treated as minority on the grounds of a 
lack of historical tradition. One has to admit that this stance contradicts the right to subjective self-
identification as a decisive factor in questions of national or ethnic belonging. This creates a 
schizophrenic situation in which the  most common subjectively-felt and officially declared national 
(ethnic?) identity is not objectively recognised by the state authorities. Some scholars try to solve this 
issue by describing Silesians as a ‘postulated’ or ‘claimed’ minority (Dolińska 2010). 
The 2012 Census shows the complexity of the issue. From the total of 809 000 persons claiming 
Silesian identity, 362 000 declared it as their only nationality, 56 000 as their first identity, but along 
with their second nationality, and 391 000 as their second nationality. Besides showing the number of 
people who identify with their  ‘Silesianness,’ it demonstrates that this is an identity in the process of 
birth or re-birth, which is multi-layered, with fuzzy boundaries,  and, most probably, which is 
emerging in a particular historical situation with its given socio-political context. Years of discussions 
and many activists’ public statements and acts have helped to consolidate it and to draw the borders 
differentiating it from the homogeneous and coherent Polish nation. Experts do not agree on the 
potential consequences of this identity building (or even nation building?). Decades of studies on 
issues of nationalism cannot help to predict the future. For sure,  this will result in further accusations 
on the part of right-wing politicians claiming that Silesian activists promote separatism, as well as in 
nationalists’ claims that this kind of activity disintegrates the nation. Interestingly, some segments of 
the society show respect for the achievements of Silesians in their uneven struggle against the 
centralized state and its bureaucracy. 
The sole history of ‘Silesians’ is a contested  issue. As Jerzy Gorzelik, the leader of RAS wrote: ‘An 
attempt to devoid the Silesian nation of any historical legitimacy means its annihilation in the minds of 
most society members’ (2004: 16). Silesian irredentism has its long traditions and Silesian 
organisations were already emerging both in Prussia and Austro-Hungary during and after the period 
of the Spring of Nations in the 19
th
 century. According to these first Silesian ‘independentionists’, 
Silesians were living in German language countries, but insisted on their Slavic cultural and linguistic 
roots as well as their Catholic faith. Independence was the aim of a number of activists shortly before, 
during and after WWI (Sekuła 2009). The Silesians began campaigning intensely for recognition after 
1918, when the fate of Upper Silesia, belonging to the then defeated Germany, was still unclear. 
During the turbulent times of post-war negotiations many sought their chance and attempted to find a 
place in the new political map organised according to Woodrow Wilson’s principle of the self-
determination of nations. Bund der Oberschlesier – Związek Górnoślązaków (Association of Upper 
Silesians) claimed independence for the ‘Upper Silesian Republic’ (cf. Gorzelik 2004: 21). Several 
similar initiatives were undertaken – e.g., the organisation of the Union of Upper Silesians aimed at 
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the creation of a neutral Silesian state under the tutelage of the League of Nations, and prince Hans 
Heinrich von Pless undertook diplomatic actions directed at a similar goal (cf. Kwaśniewski 2004: 79). 
Certain scholars claim – which seems to be an exaggeration – that up to 2.3 million Silesians opted for 
independence, but the fact is that the Union of Upper Silesians put its membership at half a million. To 
make a long story short, the inhabitants of the region were divided into protagonists of independence, 
and those opting either for Poland or for Germany. 
From an ethnographic perspective, Silesia comprised a trilingual, prevailingly Catholic region. 
German was used in secular public spaces (schools, offices, business), while Polish was the language 
of religion and religion related communication. In everyday situations, casual conversations and at 
home, Silesians usually used their own ‘dialect’ (or, one should say language?), which is Slavic, but is 
permeated with many German words and often structured according to German grammar. This 
Silesian vernacular is called godka by its users. 
By the decision of the Versailles Treaty a referendum was carried out in result of which the supporters 
of Poland, dissatisfied with its results, took to arms in three consecutive Silesian Uprisings. Ultimately 
in 1922, Upper Silesia was divided between Germany and Poland. In the German part of Silesia, the 
majority voted against autonomy. In the Polish Silesia, an autonomous region was established with its 
own parliament, but in general, assimilationist policy was implemented by the government in Warsaw.  
One may conclude that the ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural uniqueness of Silesia, which is 
typical for many borderlands, was never fully acknowledged neither by the German nor the Polish 
state. In modern history, since World War I, local inhabitants experienced often harsh policies of 
Polonisation or Germanisation, depending on which side of the border they lived. During WWII the 
whole Silesia was conquered by Hitler and subjected to oppressive Germanisation. After WWII, the 
newly installed Polish communist authorities embarked on the policy of de-Germanisation and re-
Polonisation (Linek 2001). Millions of Germans escaped from the approaching Red Army, and  later, 
the people classified as Germans by the Polish authorities were expelled. The so-called ‘autochthons’, 
whose identity was ambiguous, but who were considered redeemable to the Polish nation, could stay. 
In this heyday of nationalism, it may sound as a paradox that the criteria of this ‘national verification’ 
applied by the Polish regime were copied almost exactly from the Nazi Volksliste classification 
(Kulczycki 2001) – of course a rebours. 
 3.2. A minority or a regional group?
  
The ideology of ‘national unity’ and assimilationist policy towards Silesians after WWII, combined 
with the settlement of both settlers from the interwar Polish eastern territories in the second half of the 
1940s, and later newcomers attracted to the industrialised and linguistically de-germanised Upper 
Silesia region, had change population’s balance in the region. Additionally, the realisation of the 
disparity in the living standards between Western Germany and communist Poland led to the 
migration of almost six hundred thousand people to the Federal Republic in the period(s)? of 
migration policy liberalisation on the grounds that they themselves or their parents were former 
German citizens (Stola 2005). Continuing economic disproportions also caused another 250 thousand 
people to apply for German passports between 1990 and 2002, although most of them did not abandon 
Poland. Many, however, took up seasonal jobs in Germany or in other European countries.  
In the 1990s, a group of activists from Upper Silesia, declared that they are members of the ‘Silesian 
nation’.  In the recent past ‘autochtons’ from Upper Silesia could not so easily claim German as 
inhabitants of Opole/Oppeln region, since in the interwar period it was Polish territory. Silesians do 
not fit the binary and officially recognised nationalist scheme. The case of Silesians can be studied 
anthropologically in vivo as a case of a nation in statu nascendi, and in political terms, as an example 
of an existent, but officially unrecognised minority. Their situation contrasts with that of the 
neighbouring German minority, which has always been recognised, even by the Communists, and was 
granted full minority privileges after 1991  
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Perhaps this kind of exclusion of the Upper Silesians from the ‘German Volk’ and equivocal feelings 
about identity have caused the revival of the ideas of Silesian uniqueness and of a Silesian nation. 
Feelings of exploitation by central authorities (the region is rich in coal and is highly industrialised), a 
sense of cultural deprivation lasting for decades (the local vernacular was suppressed and – as many 
other dialects – scorned as ‘crude’ at schools), the neglect of the right to self-government combined 
with a renewed memory of pre-war autonomy, self-rule aspirations, and a nostalgia for the glorious 
past have contributed to the rise of a new identity anchored in historic traditions. 
In late 1989, the Upper Silesian Association was pushing for regional self-rule, and already in January 
1990, the Silesian Autonomy Movement was established. The latter has become a major spokesmen 
for the eastern Silesian population and it won two seats in the Parliament in the 1991 elections to Sejm 
(Kwaśniewski 2004: 81-82), a success that could not be repeated in the following elections due to the 
implementation of the law on the five per-cent threshold in 1993. Since Silesians are not recognised as 
a minority, the special voting law for minorities bypassing the threshold requirements, does not apply 
to them. This raised accusations that RAS, and later ZLNS (see below) activists, are seeking a special 
minority status in order to make political (parliamentary) careers. 
On December 11
th 1996, RAS activists created Związek Ludności Narodowości Śląskiej (ZLNS), the 
Union of People of Silesian Nationality. It was registered by the lower court, but after an appeal by the 
voivodship’s leader (wojewoda), it was denied registration in the high court. The court justified the 
decision by referring to the definition that can be found in any popular encyclopaedia: ‘a nation is an 
enduring community of people that emerged thanks to a common historical past based on a shared 
culture, language, territory and economic life that can be read in the national consciousness of its 
members’. At the same time, an ethnic group should have a specific language, culture, perceive itself 
as different from other groups, and have its own name; the national minority to which one wants to 
belong has to exist objectively. An individual cannot decide about belonging to a nation subjectively. 
The Supreme Court shared this opinion and added that ‘national minority’ is a legal term, although it 
is not defined in the Polish law, nor in international conventions (Sekuła 2009). An individual can 
choose a nation, but he or she cannot lead to the creation of a new nation. Although in common public 
opinion the Silesian ethnicity does exist, it is not a national group and has not asked to be treated as 
such. Therefore, it cannot be granted the electoral privileges accorded to other minorities 
(Kwaśniewski 2004: 83-84). Moreover, the ‘legal recognition of the Silesian minority would endanger 
the rights of other groups, such as, the Mazurs, Kashubians and Carpathian mountaineers who, in spite 
of their ethnic and cultural distinction, are not recognised as national minorities’ (Łodziński 2012: 
143). 
ZLNS brought the case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The Court argued that 
it is not in its competence to decide whether Silesians comprise a nation or not, and to give a definition 
of it, but it admitted that such a recognition would imply a dispensation from the five per-cent limit in 
parliamentary elections. It argued that individuals should limit their rights in order to protect the 
‘country’s stability’. Poland did not violate the European Convention. A following appeal to the Grand 
Chamber of the European Tribunal in Strasbourg was finally dismissed in February 2004. It stated that 
Polish authorities had not denied the existence of Silesians, and that Silesians can pursue their goals 
without being a legally recognised minority (Kwaśniewski 2004: 85-86). 
In result, RAS redefined itself as an association of ‘people who [merely] declare their Silesian 
nationality’ (our emphasis), while ZNLS continued its struggle for registration. In 2004 it applied to 
the court for registration again, but it was denied to them in 2007. Meanwhile Silesians, referring to 
the 2002 Census results, also appealed to the parliamentary commission, which at that time was 
working  on the law on ethnic and national minorities, to recognise them, if not as a national minority, 
then as an ethnic minority. Despite their presence (see above a confirmation by one of our 
interviewees), the appeals went unheard. According to the Commission, the ‘prominent scholars’ 
consulted, mainly ethnologists and sociologists, were of the opinion that Silesians have a distinct 
social identity, but that they sustain different national identities, i.e. Polish, Czech and German. A plea 
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to recognise the Silesian language also cannot be acknowledged by the Commission, since linguists 
consider it to be a dialect of Polish. The fact that fifty six thousand people declared in 2002 that they 
spoke Silesian at home did not help; but Silesian can be heard in local broadcasting (e.g. TV Silesia), 
on the internet, in rap songs, and it can be read in many media reports. The denial of recognition as a 
minority group in Poland also means the lack of governmental subsidies for the protection of ethnic, 
linguistic, and cultural practices.  
 In political life, RAS tried not only to mobilise and unite all those who identify as Silesians, but also 
to collaborate with the German minority that is quite numerous in the Opole voivodship. These 
attempts were mostly unsuccessful due to the competition between the two groups in the political 
arena and the historical rivalry between German, Polish and Silesian options among the local 
population. As indicated above, the relationships have always been dynamic, and the well-established 
and recognised Germans are afraid of losing supporters at the expense of Silesians. These are fully 
substantiated fears, because as statistics show, the number of declared Germans in Poland has fallen 
from 153 000 to 102 000 between 2002 and 2012. It may have happened that some persons emigrated, 
but most probably, many who became aware that they can opt for Silesian nationality chose it instead 
of the German one. 
4.  Methodology of the study 
The empirical part of this report is based on secondary sources (scientific literature on Silesia and 
Silesians, documents, reports and expert documents on minorities and their political participation in 
Poland, and articles in newspapers commenting on the ‘camouflaged German option’ controversy), as 
well as primary data (interviews) concerning the political activity of Ruch Autonomii Śląska. The 
secondary sources are to a large extent Internet sources – web sites, forums and comments. RAS’s 
activity is to a large extent centred on the Internet. There are virtually no printed versions of the 
organisation’s charter and statement, no flyers or manifestos. Actually, broad  access to the Internet in 
Silesia has enabled the development of RAS, which would be otherwise difficult due to the lack of 
external funding (the organisation is funded by membership fees: 5 zlotys per month, i.e. 1,20 euro 
only). As chairman of the Katowice Circle stated: 
 ‘We minimize the amount of paper. One thing is that we have a modest office [in Katowice], the 
other thing is that the electronic versions of documents create order’ [M. K.]. 
The interviews were conducted in January and February 2012. Four semi-structured, very long (2 
hours each) qualitative interviews with RAS leaders and members in the two main cities of Silesia – 
Katowice and Opole – were conducted. They were recorded and  transcribed. In the body of the report, 
citations from the interviews end with the initials of our interlocutors. The interview guides and the list 
of interviews can be found in Annex I of this report. The interviewees participated in the interviews 
very willingly, and they are accustomed to journalists’ and researchers’ interest in RAS’s activities. 
Since ZLNS has been registered, activists from Opole spent a lot of time giving interviews and taking 
part in meetings and discussions with sociologists and political scientists from different regions. No 
doubt, Silesians attract interest of both the local and national media. They use the media’s and 
scholars’ interest as a () means of communicating their ideas. Because many activities of the 
organisation are based on the Internet (web sites, Facebook), contact with the leaders and members 
was not difficult, except for Jerzy Gorzelik
7
 – still the President of RAS, and now also a board 
member of the Silesian Province governance. Interviewees showed a desire to give the most 
comprehensive report on the objectives and activities of their organisation. 
The amount of data satisfactory for this research analysis was reached quite quickly as it turned out 
that the same people had been interviewed on the issue of ‘Silesians’ by both scholars and journalists  
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and they proved to be very outspoken and articulate on the issue. Conference organisers and the 
editors of scientific volumes about the cultural and political aspects of the Silesians constitute a small 
group of people, and they are in part actively engaged in reframing the image of Silesia and Silesians 
in Poland. After analysing scholarly literature on the subject, it appeared that individuals circulate 
between organisations or take initiative in to create new institutions (e.g., RAS members left the local 
branch in Opole and formed SONS – Stowarzyszenie Osób Narodowości Śląskiej, the Association of 
People of Silesian Nationality). In most academic publications, one can find interviews with the same 
persons, repeating the same information. There are several ‘on duty’ activists, always ready to talk 
about their region and their identity. The leader of Law and Justice, Jarosław Kaczyński, is 
understandably unreachable and several local party members did not want to talk about the, in their 
opinion outdated, events concerning the Silesian issue. 
The interviewees were surprised by the anonymity ensured by the interviewer, i.e. Katarzyna 
Chlewińska, because they are often interrogated by journalists under their own names and, actually, 
they look forward to publicity. Virtually all of them identify with the efforts aimed at creating a 
Silesian autonomy and see themselves as true Silesians engaged in building a new identity and 
strengthening the movement. This attitude is radically different from that of the educator  we 
interviewed before (Buchowski and Chewińska 2011:12). It demonstrates the specificity of this 
organisation, whose members are young, uncompromising people that are not afraid to advocate  ideas 
opposing the mainstream public discourse.  
In the interpretation of the materials we applied the method of  thematic analysis. We have looked for 
meanings and concepts emerging in the discussion on specific issues. Common ideas and statements 
from the interviews, press articles, policy documents, internet forums and academic works have been 
integrated and identified into a limited number of themes that are of our interest and that are helpful in 
understanding our interlocutors’ attitudes towards tolerance, diversity and pluralism in the Polish 
political life. 
5. Silesian Autonomy – the political challenge 
The case of RAS, Silesians and their political and cultural status has been constantly recurring in 
Polish public debates since the 1990s, often in relation to contemporary political challenges. It serves  
as an example of post-transformational tensions between the policy and practice of national unity and 
the grassroots efforts of people in some regions to change the dominant cultural schemata. In the 
centralised Polish state, any challenge to undermine this kind of monolithic socio-political set up 
which is permeated by the image of a homogenous Polish nation, and any claims to recognise not only 
minority rights, but also the possibility to practice them in public life, are often interpreted as 
dangerous and as undermining integrity. Attempts at implementing constitutionally granted 
entitlements to cultural visibility and the execution of civic rights are perceived either as 
unsubstantiated and unnecessary demands of an insignificant number of people, or as a result of the 
overambitious goals of some activists that manipulate history and people. They present a threat to 
homogeneous society. Even liberally-minded politicians share this paradigm of an integral and united 
polity. 
This state of affairs can be, to a certain extent, justified by the 20
th
 century history of a society 
devastated by two wars and several waves of ethnic cleansings, but the rigidity of this discourse and 
practice is striking. In the last local elections held in 2010, RAS, the unofficial political representative 
of the Silesian ‘minority’, managed to win 8.49% of votes and three out of 48 seats in the local 
parliament. Sejmik’s arithmetic enabled it to become a partner in the ruling coalition in the Upper 
Silesia voivodship. These political events have stirred a hectic debate. A spectacular part of it was a 
report prepared by the major rightist oppositional party in the country, Law and Justice (Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwość, hereafter PiS). It is discussed below. ‘The report on the state of the State’ prepared by 
PiS claims that Silesians are a ‘camouflaged German option’, i.e. it connects Silesian organizations 
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promoting the autonomy of the region and the strengthening of Silesian cultural identity with some 
kind of an anti-Polish ideology, without even attempting to explain this notion and casual link. 
Nonetheless, since the emergence of the regional coalition in Silesia with RAS in it, this opinion 
represents a radical version of  more moderate attacks on RAS and its alleged separatist policy, or of 
accusations of treason of vaguely understood ‘Polishness’. 
The discussions around RAS have been selected, because we want to expose the potential power of 
negative emotions and reactions that they evoke towards the Silesian minority and its associations in 
Poland. As indicated, these bodies fight for more than mere recognition of the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by law. The denial of such  identity, and right-wing circles' accusations of damage incurred 
to the Polish state, shifts the discussion from arguments about the representation of Silesians to ones 
about the challenging of their right to exercise regional identity. 
This case shows, on the one hand, how the opportunities offered by Poland’s participation in the 
structures of the European Union (especially European support for regional movements and  minority 
organisations) are actually used by local activists and minority organisations, and, on the other hand, 
how they are interpreted within the mainstream political debate. The attacks on RAS illustrate strong 
universalising tendencies and unifying themes present in the rhetoric of the nationalistically minded 
segments of the society and rightist politicians, who have used the case to weaken the ruling coalition 
and  often use it as an argument against political opponents. In short, it illustrates how the issue of 
basic civil rights can be a hostage of political stalemate as well as how it may unveil  the structural 
mechanisms of political life. 
5.1  Relevance of the case study 
The proposed case study of RAS’s reception and rejection raises issues of what can or cannot be 
tolerated in political life in Poland in the sphere of the political representation of minorities and it 
shows the boundary-drawing process in the political life of the country.  
The proposed study covers part b) and c) of the cluster ‘Norms and practices of political participation’ 
and gives a wider view on the possible cases in the  non-tolerated – tolerated – accepted forms of 
political engagement of different minority organisations in mainstream politics in the country.  
We will focus on the last decade, as it brought the emergence of minority organisations in Poland, 
with special attention given to the year 2011, when the last direct attacks on the political 
representatives of Silesians took place. We will also sketch the necessary historical background in 
order to illustrate the wider context of  toleration/non-toleration towards minorities in Poland and the 
socio-historical status of Silesia/Silesians. 
 
5.2  Setting the Scene  
As just mentioned, the decisive  incentive for this report is The Report on the State of the Republic
8
. 
published by the major right-wing party, PiS. This formation is led by Jarosław Kaczyński – former 
Prime Minister and twin brother of the late Polish president Lech Kaczyński, who died in a plane crash 
near Smolensk in April 2010.  The 116-page document is a list of charges against the ruling party, 
Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform, hereafter PO) and  its leader, Prime Minister Donald Tusk. 
The right-wing rhetoric of the oppressed nation and the threat of Polish identity used in the report was 
a tool used for discrediting PO.  
The report has no single author, it represents PiS’s platform, in which various aspects of the state's 
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functioning are addressed (economy, political conflicts, integration with the European Union, 
education), but it also puts an emphasis on the state of the art of Polish national identity. 
In line with PiS’s usual arguments, ‘The Report’ also accuses the ruling party of a lack of patriotism 
and of indifference to a progressing degeneration of national identity. These kind of charges appear 
repeatedly from the beginning of the rule of the government led by PO, especially against its Prime 
Minister. PiS presents Donald Tusk as a threat to national unity, emphasising his Kashubian origin 
(see: Nijakowski 2009), or even the fact that his father was conscripted to the Wehrmacht during 
WWII.
9
 
The reactions to this report were quite predictable – the supporters of the right-wing ideas praised the 
accuracy of the analysis, while the supporters of the ruling party depicted ‘The Report...’ as the  
opposition’s futile bitterness and always predictable radicalism. Several comments disparaging the 
report appeared. One of the PO leaders, Rafał Grupiński, stated: 
‘It is hard to call this kind of material a report on the state of the state, because even a cursory 
overview shows that it is rather a report on the mental state of the report’s authors, who are not 
satisfied with the fact that they do not wield power, and who generally express dissatisfaction 
with everything in every area of life
10
. 
Considering the realities of the Polish political life, one can see this publication as a part of a long-
lasting competition between two parties, which regained its momentum before the Fall elections in 
2011. However, the report expresses  many people’s attitude towards minorities. We accept the view 
that ‘the limits to the politically possible are set in language: concepts in politics can only stand for 
that which the discourse makes possible. Members of a polity are not free – nor they are able – to 
create personal meanings they attach to the political realm. They necessarily draw on the template 
provided in the discourse’ (Kovács 2003: 298). But at the same time ‘narratives [reflect] the social 
world as well as construct it’ (Klumbyte 2003: 280). In the latter sense, the controversies regarding 
Silesians have had one remarkable and unexpected outcome – they revived interest in Silesians, their 
existence, rights and identity. They have re-invented them and they created new members of  the 
‘Silesian nation’. 
   6.  The Silesians as the ‘camouflaged German option’ 
In the chapter of ‘The Report’ entitled ‘Timid Polish Nation’ (Wstydliwy Naród Polski) (p. 34-36) the 
authors claim that the ruling party has an ambivalent attitude towards the Nation and that it acts to its 
disadvantage: 
‘There are many reasons to conclude that the issue of the Nation is not raised in the programs 
and key statements of the Civic Platform, although there are some statements about Poles and 
Poland’s position. On the other hand, in its message, the Platform strongly emphasises the 
importance of regionalisms, a particular example being the ostentatious emphasising of 
Kashubian descent by Donald Tusk. Recently, contrary to the judgement of the Supreme Court 
in 2007, the Silesian nationality was included in the Census. The Supreme Court rightly 
concluded that, historically speaking,  there is no Silesian nation. One might add that 
Silesianness [śląskość] that  rejects Polish nationality, is simply a way to distance oneself  from 
Polishness and, presumably, simply to adopt the camouflaged  German option.’ (p. 34-35) 
The quoted section of ‘The Report’ raised an immediate reaction of the Silesian activists, the German 
                                                     
9 In October 2011, parliamentary elections were held -  Law and Justice lost to the Civic Platform. One of the results was the 
secession of a more far-right formation called ‘Solidary Poland’. 
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minority and other communities outraged by these statements
11
. 
PiS’s leader asserted at a press conference12 that when in power (2005-2007) his party did nothing 
against the Silesians' or Kashubians’ right to self-identification, as some suggested. While it is true – 
so Kaczyński –  that ‘we consider the assertion that there exists a Silesian nation camouflaged as a 
German option,’ at the same time, PiS accepts and appreciates Silesianness and Kashubianness as a 
part of Polishness. Adam Hofman, spokesmen of PiS, also explained the stance of his party so that no 
one had any doubts about the meaning of the challenged statement: 
‘To explain it fully: we have nothing against Silesians. Silesianness is Polishness. We meant the 
kind of Silesianness that questions Polish national identity and rejects Polishness, as does Mr. 
Gorzelik  who wants to create a Silesian state. We have nothing against self-government, we 
have nothing against pride in your region, we are against separatisms.’ 
However, these elucidations did not convince Silesians (especially RAS members, but also the 
inhabitants of Silesia actively engaged in the autonomy movement), or the members of the German 
minority living in Silesia. Bernard Gajda, leader of the German minority in Poland, wrote an open 
letter on behalf of the Association of German Social-Cultural Associations in Poland: 
‘The official statement of Jarosław Kaczyński, leader of one of the largest political parties in 
Poland, openly slandered hundreds of thousands of Polish citizens of German nationality and 
origin. This wording suggests that Germans are worse citizens of Poland, and that Germanness 
disqualifies anybody from being a good citizen’13. 
One of the reactions to the discussion on the character of Silesian identity was  the filing of an offence 
to the Prosecutor's Office in Warsaw. A group of PO members from Silesia together with members of 
the  German minority association led by Gajda asked the persecutor to decide whether the report’s 
authors committed a crime by scorning and offending Silesians and Germans. This question was 
definitely not considered in the frame of respect (see: Dobbernack and Modood 2011: 32), or the 
recognition of minority groups and their identity. Instead, it was analysed mainly in terms of freedom 
of speech and the use of offensive words. 
In May 2011, the Prosecutor of the Warsaw-Ochota district, after screening the referred case, refused 
to launch an investigation of these reports. The refusal was justified with the argument that the phrase 
‘disguised German option’ used by PiS in ‘The Report...’  is not discriminatory and does not constitute 
a public insult towards an ethnic group or nationality
14
. 
Jerzy Gorzelik, RAS’s President, replied to PiS15. He referred to the charges posed by Adam Hofman 
as: 
‘absurd,  the result of the  political class's general  ignorance of  Silesian affairs . Upper Silesia 
has for long been  inhabited by people who identify themselves as Silesians and, 
simultaneously, some of them consider themselves to be Poles, and others see themselves as 
Germans, and still others identify only with the Silesian identity, and this is no reason to enter on 
a war path.  It is an reference that people like me – those who declared  Silesian identity in the 
2002 Census 9 years ago – are insincere because they do not have the courage to admit they 
are Germans. If I was a German, I would declare it right away, because there is nothing wrong 
                                                     
11 Originally, this phrase was formulated  differently: ‘One might add that Silesianness is simply a way to distance oneself 
from Polish nationality and, presumably, simply to adopt a disguised German option’, but at the request of PiS activists from 
Silesia and Kashubia it had been extended and rephrased. 
12 http://www.tvn24.pl/0,1698280,0,1,pis-poprawia-wnbspraporcie-kwestie-slaska,wiadomosc.html 
13 http://wyborcza.pl/1,75478,9383324,Polscy_Niemcy__Jaroslaw_Kaczynski_nas_szkaluje.html 
14 http://www.dziennikzachodni.pl/artykul/406401,po-sie-poddalo-zakamuflowana-opcja-niemiecka-bez-odwolania,id,t.html; 
http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114873,9396676,_Zakamuflowana_opcja_niemiecka___Bedzie_kolejne_doniesie
nie.html?order=najstarsze&v=1&obxx=9396676 
15 http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114873,9377498,Rzecznik_PiS_o_slaskosci__Nie_jestesmy_idiotami.html 
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in being a German or a Czech. Such an attitude towards the citizens of the Polish Republic is 
unacceptable and based on frail premises.’ 
Silesians (not just RAS members) also used less conventional methods in defence of their cause – they 
created websites with cutting, sharp comments on the words of the of PiS leader and filled Internet 
forums with rather ruthless and unrefined statements. The Internet was swarmed with mocking 
comments and paraphrases
16
.  
In July 2011, Jarosław Kaczyński visited Katowice in the then running election campaign. RAS 
members used this opportunity to remind Silesians of the report published in Spring and of the debate 
that followed. A group of activists waited for Kaczyński with T-shirts expressing their attitude towards 
his visit – some prints said ‘undercover German’ or ‘non Polonus Silesius’, and on some a short 
glossary of words in the Silesian language appeared. They failed, however, to give Kaczyński  the 
gifts they had prepared and they declared to send them by post to Warsaw, together with the book 
Ghosts of War, by a former regional counsellor, an indigenous Silesian, Alojzy Lyska. It is about the 
WW II and the fate of his father, drafted to the Wehrmacht
17
. 
The issue of the ‘camouflaged German option’ engaged the press for several weeks and then slowly 
faded away. The problem of Silesian identity was cited again in late 2011, when the Association of 
People of Silesian Nationality (Stowarzyszenie Osób Narodowości Śląskiej: SONS) was registered. 
6.1.  The Association of People of Silesian Nationality 
The registration of the Association of People of Silesian Nationality (hereafter SONS) was a 
watershed event from the perspective of Silesian identity activists. All previous attempts at creating an 
organisation promoting ‘Silesianness’ were unsuccessful. In 1998, the Supreme Court refused to 
register the Union of People of Silesian Nationality (ZLNS), declaring that Silesian nationality does 
not exist. The Association of Persons Declaring Silesian Nationality also had not been registered (the 
Supreme Court refused its registration in 2007),
18
 although its leaders referred to the census carried out 
in 2002, in which – as it is shown above in table 1 – Silesian nationality was declared by almost 180 
thousand people. 
Similarly to Upper Silesia, Silesians from Opole established an association for people who feel neither 
Poles nor Germans, but who want to preserve and cultivate their Silesian identity. The Association 
aims at preserving and cultivating  Silesian culture and abstains from politics, although many of its 
founders are also members of the Opole Branch of RAS . 
At the end of March 2011, the founding documents were filed in a court in Opole. Silesians claimed 
that the registration of the association would mean the recognition of Silesian nationality in Poland, 
which was their goal, as they did not want to be suspended in a social vacuum. However, the Court 
dismissed the application and ordered the removal of any references to () Silesian nationality, arguing 
that ‘the Silesian ethnic group is not a separate nation or a minority, and therefore it is not acceptable 
to determine oneself as a member of a Silesian nation.’19 
The founders appealed the decision  in June 2011. They stressed that  although there is no definition of 
a Silesian nation in the Polish law, there is  a definition of nationality included in the Law on the 
Census of 2011. It says that nationality is a national or ethnic affinity, i.e. ‘a declarative, individual 
feature of every person, based on a subjective feeling,  and expressing an emotional, (or) cultural (or 
                                                     
16 http://spieprzajdziadu.com/muzeum/index.php?title=Zakamuflowana_opcja_niemiecka 
17 
http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114873,9882103,Kaczynskiego_na_Slasku_wita__zakamuflowana_opcja_niemiec
ka_.html 
18 http://opole.gazeta.pl/opole/1,35114,10884274,Stowarzyszenie_Osob_Narodowosci_Slaskiej_zarejestrowane_.html 
19 See: Charter of SONS. 
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one related to the origin of the parents) connection  to a particular nation or ethnic community’ 
(Methodological manual for the 2011 Census: 55). On December 21st, the court decided to register 
SONS. Therefore, it has been officially recognised that nationality and ethnicity are not just a matter 
of roots, but also a matter of individual choice. The Opole court could not ignore the new provision in 
the charter of the association, under which SONS declares that it will not register as an election 
committee or compete in any elections
20
.  
The statutory purposes of the Association include
21: ‘1.Fostering and anchoring the common 
consciousness of Silesians; 2. Revival of Silesian culture; 3. Promotion of knowledge about Silesia; 4. 
Shaping and developing young people’s active citizenship in Silesia, formation of a sense of full 
engagement in and responsibility for their homeland; 5. Participation in the modern? integration of all 
population groups living in Silesia; 6. Sustaining cultural contacts between Silesians, no matter where 
they live, helping those willing to return from emigration; 7. Promotion and creation of a positive 
image of Silesia and Silesians; 8. Caring for the preservation of the material and spiritual heritage of 
Silesia’. 
On January 10th, the Opole court received an appeal concerning the registration of SONS. 
The prosecutor appealed against the order in full, because – as argued in the appeal – the court issued a 
decision to register the association, although the charter of SONS violates the general principles of law 
and the values expressed by the whole system of law, and in particular Article 2 of the Law on 
National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language
22
. The Prosecutor argued: ‘The literature 
emphasises that the charter does not comply with the law, not only when it violates a particular 
standard, but also when it is in contradiction with certain general principles of law or values expressed 
by the legal system. For example, according to the Supreme Court, the charter is inconsistent with the 
law if it tries to create a non-existent national minority’23. 
The Founding Committee of the Association learned of the appeal from the local media. 
They gained access to the grounds of the appeal through personal contacts with journalists. By law, the 
Association still exists and has the right to act in accordance with its statutory objectives. As one of 
the leaders states: 
‘We still haven’t received any official documents from the prosecutor or the court. We know 
that it [the registration of the Association] was contested by the local media. We got 
information from the court that SONS is functioning rightfully, we have just listed a new board. 
We also got the necessary legal confirmations from the various institutions, such as, the 
Statistical Office, or the Revenue, so we formally continue to operate. But we are still waiting, 
we know that something is happening – the prosecution filed an appeal. It has come back to the 
court of first instance, and we know that the judge has already written a justification, but we 
have not received it, I saw only fragments of it in a newspaper article.(…) 
There have been various calls by local politicians that the people who have the right to appeal 
[against SONS registration]  should do so – the Governor of  Opole has the right, but he didn’t 
use it – and it turned out that the local prosecutor also has the right. So there has been a swift 
reaction of politicians but the prosecutor hasn’t filed his appeal until the last possible day. 
Probably they are waiting for the justification of the registration of SONS, as the judge did not 
                                                     
20 http://www.polityka.pl/kraj/opinie/1522995,1,stowarzyszenie-zarejestrowane-ale-to-nie-koniec.read 
21 http://slonzoki.org/ 
22 
http://msw.gov.pl/portal/pl/178/2958/Ustawa_o_mniejszosciach_narodowych_i_etnicznych_oraz_o_jezyku_regionalnym.ht
ml 
23 
http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114883,10951900,Prokuratura_nie_godzi_sie_na_rejestracje_Stowarzyszenia.html
?lokale=poznan 
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have to justify it before a request for an appeal was filed. I also know [from an informal source] 
that a radical association asked for participation in the trial, an organization called the Opole 
Association of National Remembrance, but apparently they were rejected. I also know it from 
the media only. But they still have 7 days to appeal, they may become a party in the trial – as 
they are a patriotic organization fighting for Polish independence, and we [Silesians] are seen 
as a threat to it.’ [P.D.] 
The SONS 
24
 is functioning well, new applications and cultural projects are being constantly delivered. 
Its members organise excursions to memorials significant to Silesia and the regional tradition,  and 
they organize projects that aim at language preservation and want to strengthen the awareness of the 
Silesian tradition. Every press release regarding the organisation attracts the attention of other media 
and researchers studying identity and society. The activists are waiting for the judgment of the court 
with ease and are prepared for further appeals. They are fully convinced that their reasons are justified 
and they are determined to promote Silesian identity.  
Some SONS members are also activists of RAS in the Opole voivodship. According to the interviewed 
leader of SONS [P.D.], in the beginning, half of the Association's members had this double affiliation, 
however, many other are applying and,  today, members of RAS constitute less than one-fifth of 
SONS's members. The Association has gained more members who are not interested in politics and 
who ‘merely’ want to promote and strengthen regional identity and culture. This does not prevent 
SONS opponents from equating it with RAS and creating its separatist image. Thus, organisation is 
also accused of separatism and anti-Polish activities. SONS’s case illustrates that even a group 
promoting a historically shaped cultural distinctiveness and  wishing to preserve the cultural heritage 
of the region , a group striving for its recognition, can be seen as endangering the state and the nation. 
7. Thematic analysis 
In the course of  thematic analysis of the collected  material and academic literature, we have 
identified three themes in order to answer the questions of the limits of ethno-political tolerance in 
Poland:  
1. what kind of groups and claims can be tolerated in political life?  
2. on what terms can the groups express their difference and fight for their rights?  
3. what is not tolerated in public/political life in Poland? 
Themes: 
(1) The question of Silesian identity as a dominant factor in relations between the ‘centre’ and 
‘periphery’ – the well-established notions of ‘Silesian harm’ and the ‘internal colonisation’ of 
Silesia within the Polish state vs. the renewed discourse of the Great Silesia and its socio-
economic potential.   
(2) Nation vs. Republic – a ‘black-and-white’ perception of cultural differences with the rhetoric 
of the endangered nation coming from the mainstream media and rightist political circles, 
which are competing with republican points of view and the rhetoric of ‘Europe of regions’, 
which are  growing in popularity. This topic is combined with the theme of the ‘threat of the 
independence of the Polish state’ and the stereotype of a German threat. 
(3) The problem of the political representation of minorities and their absence in the mainstream 
media – the marginalisation of minorities (in media, public education, the lack of their public 
visibility). Consequently, any debate on the question of the identity of minorities is usually 
very emotional and rarely refers to arguments based on research and expertise. The debate on 
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Silesians involves many activists of the group which, combined with the minimal level of 
knowledge about this group, heats discussions (Pędziwiatr 2009). 
7.1.  Silesian identity in dispute – ‘Silesian harm’ or ‘The Great Silesia’? 
Silesia is considered by pro-Silesian activists to be a multi-cultural land, whose borderland character 
has shaped the identity of the people differently than it in other parts of Poland. In this view, Silesia is 
a space permeated by German, Polish and Czech culture; all of them have been influencing the region 
to a different degree for centuries. Bilingualism and multiculturalism have shaped the specific identity 
of Silesia’s inhabitants, which rests on a strong identification with the place of birth and living (in 
German Heimat). In the periods of political tensions between Poles and Germans, identification with 
the local motherland functioned as the best viable and psychologically safe alternative (Glensk, 
Szewczyk and Marek 2002: 83). 
In effect, according to some sociologists, the core elements of the Silesian identity consist of a sense 
of distance from the successive ‘dominators’, a commitment to family and the protection of family 
ties, as well as the use of the local vernacular. Studies conducted in Silesia show that most Silesians 
identify themselves, first of all, in relation to the cities and the region they live in, while other persons 
living in Silesia, but identifying themselve as Poles, most frequently refer to such terms as the state 
and nation (Bokszański 2005: 95).  
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Silesia was the region perceived by Poles as an advanced 
German zone and by the Germans – as a culturally retarded and inferior region, because it was 
associated with Poland. Therefore, when Silesia was annexed wholly to the Polish state after WWII, 
the Silesians were – as discussed in part 2.1 – subjected to Polonisation. This policy was similar to that 
from the period of partitions – when western regions experienced Germanisation, and the eastern part 
of Silesia was subjected to Russification.  
Since WWII, Silesians and their culture were subjected to the above-mentioned and painful 
Polonisation , the  feeling of being dominated emerged again and intensified. In an anthropological 
sense, this image is not only a stereotype, but it also determines the  perception the social world  
(Wódz and Wódz 1999: 152).  
Significant in this context is the syndrome of ‘Silesian harm’. It is a belief, widespread especially 
among the older generation of Silesians that the indigenous population was subjected to various kinds 
of harassment and violence on the part of the successive invaders and provincial governors, especially 
since the end of WWI. Painful memories include the passage of the Red Army through Silesia during 
WWII, the harmful and brutal de-Germanistation and re-Polonisation after the war (including the 
deportation of Silesians to former Nazi concentration camps on the Polish territory
25
), and a number of 
repressions experienced by local people under the communist rule in the People’s Republic, such as, 
imprisonment, persecution and even murder (Gerlich 2010: 228-229). 
The belief that the region and its inhabitants fell victim to various invaders is often combined with 
indirect expectations that this harm should be compensated by the Polish state. According to this 
conviction, the resources of the region have been corrupted, the culture passed down from generation 
to generation damaged and condescended, and the creative potential of the land and people totally 
destroyed. 
As recalled by one of the interviewees:   
‘To a certain point in time I was brought up in the belief that I am a Pole. I am a Pole. No one 
in my family was a member of the German minority, even though we have German passports. It 
is, what I call, an unnecessary inevitability. Because I never used it. (...) My parents first taught 
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us to speak Polish. As they saw that we know how to speak Polish and we do not have a problem 
with the language (we efficiently use the official code that has been adopted here in Poland) 
they started speaking Silesian to us – this way we wouldn’t take on this particular accent. I have  
no accent when I speak Polish. Sometimes when I meet other Silesians and I do not say where I 
am from, they are surprised that I am a Silesian, although they did not hear the accent.’ [W.G.] 
Consequently, the turbulent history has enhanced a specific attitude to others in the population 
inhabiting Upper Silesia and to their place in the social space. The ‘Catechism of Silesian truths’, 
presented by an expert on Silesian affairs, based on biographical interviews with native Silesians, 
states the following: ‘1. Remember that you are a Silesian. 2. Do not boast of the fact that you are a 
Silesian. 3. Take good care of Silesian traditions, religion and language. 4. Watch out for others (non-
Silesians). 5. Do what you do, but do not overreach. 6.  (…) 7. Speak only as much as needed. 8. 
Always be careful of what you are doing. 9. (…) 10. Do not speak well of the Germans, their culture, 
civilization and achievements. 11. Do not deny you are a Silesian. 12. (…) 13. When somebody 
speaks well of Silesians/Silesia and the Silesian land, be alert. 14.  Adjust to every situation, you 
should not be criticized or mocked because of your Silesian origin. 15. Remember, you have to endure 
many humiliations, like our ancestors, because the most important thing is the survival of our tradition 
(Gerlich 2010: 94). 
On the other hand, Silesians are considered by outsiders, and consider themselves to be a people 
extremely tolerant towards others, open and welcoming to visitors. The stereotypical Silesian  
characteristics include such notions as, passion for order, dutifulness, discipline, organisational skills, 
and a pragmatic attitude, which are contrasted with the romantic and irrational Poles. Silesians have no 
respect for daredevils (Glensk et al. 2002: 102). This puts them in opposition to the settlers from other 
regions in Poland and causes tensions. It even sparks some conflicts in contemporary Silesia. One can 
add that such distancing towards the now internal Others shows features described as orientalism (Said 
1998). Closeness to the West, historic relations to Germany, cultural traits interpreted as ‘civilised’ 
traditions justify feelings of cultural superiority to the parts of the population that have their roots in 
the former Russian partition or in the poverty-stricken Austrian Galicia.  
It seems that this internal Orientalism is now superseding the ‘harm syndrome’. The image of 
traditional Silesia’s suffering is losing its power. The younger generation refers to a different period of 
Silesian history than the time of injustice and violence in the twentieth century. They prefer to reach to 
the glorious past of the rich, technologically advanced and distinctive region of Silesia in the 
nineteenth century. 
In short, RAS’s growing popularity, visible in the support for RAS’s candidates in local elections, lies, 
among other reasons, in this reference to the  Silesian ‘Golden Age’ (Gerlich 2010: 299). 
As the leader of the RAS Circle in Katowice said: 
‘RAS was established in 1990 or 1991, so when I was in the first years of primary school (...) it 
was still on the wave of optimism after the fall of the communist regime. It took some years to 
modernise RAS enough to attract younger people. When Jerzy Gorzelik began to serve as 
president of the association, he was the spiritus movens of RAS, a man with charisma. As an 
academic, he had contact with young people and, in fact, he created a generational upheaval in 
RAS. From what I know from the stories, in the 1990s RAS was a group of older people, 
supporting the traditional Silesian identification, a conservative option which did not appeal to 
young people, or at least to me. This traditional Silesian identity was based on a sense of 
injustice. Today, RAS is completely different.’ [M.K.] 
Both of the above topics strengthen the sense of the uniqueness of Silesia and the exceptional nature of 
Silesians in relation to Poland and Poles. Regardless of which of the two themes is emphasised – harm 
and internal colonialism, or the great history and the rich resources of Silesia with Silesians as a 
unique group of people endowed with extraordinary potential [see: interview with W. G.] – Silesia is 
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always described in opposition to the Polish aggressor or Polish backwardness. This approach to the 
relationship between the distinct periphery and the dominant centre implicitly assumes conflict and 
imbalance, which are fuelled by successive minor slights of the central government towards the 
Silesians, such as – for instance – the non-participation of central authorities’ leaders in celebrations of 
Silesian Uprisings anniversaries (Kijonka 2004). Silesia is thus denied by the central authorities and, 
therefore, its traditions are not fully accepted by the Polish state or integrated into the national memory 
and myths. It is tolerated when it fits the mainstream homogenising rhetoric and fulfils the will of the 
‘invaders’. 
Despite official declarations about the endorsement of regionalism announced by all political factions, 
this contradiction between words and practice is striking. 
7.2. Republic vs. Nation - what is radical about RAS? 
What, then, brings together Silesian identity, RAS and its reception (i.e. the lack of acceptance by 
central authorities and by many ethnic Poles), and the right-wing Law and Justice? The common 
denominator of these three phenomena is their reference to the nature of Polishness.  
The complex history of Silesia and its cultural heritage, and  the ‘core’ identity of Silesians  do not fit 
the dominant homogenising and centralistic images of the nation and the state. Silesian activists, 
especially, but not only, those from SONS and RAS, , who aim to solidify cultural particularity and 
regional identity, which is different from both German and Polish traditions, are confronted with a 
‘black-and-white’, unifying perception of the integral Polish nation. 
A binary view of the social world homogenises the cultural, social and ethnic map; it also displays a 
tendency to categorise groups which are different from the majority, as an imagined, but politically 
real whole which constitutes a  threat. It raises fears of those that have the  potential of gaining 
political power and playing a role in the political arena. The idea of a unified nation, combined with 
the image of the omnipresent threats to its integrity, is often stimulated by the right-wing parties. Such 
a conceptual and political circle creates conflicts whenever a minority group demands its rights and 
becomes involved in politics or social affairs in a way that is different from that specified by the 
majority. Only those groups are tolerated, which remain silent or invisible and do not question the 
vision of a homogeneous cultural-political body, i.e. an integral polity and nation. In this perspective, 
RAS’s claims threaten the principal idea of a national community in Poland.  
This dominant idea of society is strengthened by the chase for the sensational news  and accelerated by 
public education – official school curricula represent the national narration and are full of patriotic 
rhetoric. They do not reflect the growing multiculturalism and mostly ignore non-Polish perspectives 
on history and culture (Buchowski and Chlewińska 2011). In result, republican ideas are seen as 
detrimental to the cultivation of patriotism and the respect of the nation. 
The active members of RAS are subject to right-wing politicians’ aggressive attacks; the latter also 
limit the acceptance of liberal ideas and push moderate politicians to make more radical statements. In 
other words, nationalistically-minded politicians define the discourse and set the limits of tolerance for 
otherness. For them, a ‘true’ Pole, a very often used notion, is: a Polish national who is Roman-
Catholic and uniformly traditional. (One should keep in mind that we describe popular images and we 
are fully aware of how multivocal these notions are.). As a RAS leader states: 
‘We use the law to express unpopular views and, of course, we get a scolding. RAS is the target 
of verbal attacks, and Jerzy Gorzelik draws most of the aggression. If you have ideas outside the 
mainstream politics in Poland, you still pay the price. You need to have thick skin. (...) I’m going 
to make a small confession: it took me some time to grow to the point where I was able to exist 
in the media as M.K., a member of RAS. It wasn’t easy to become recognizable [M.K. is the 
president of the branch  in Katowice]. Operating in the public space as a RAS member can 
result in generalised aggression – not only from ‘Law and Justice’s’ or ‘Solidary Poland’s’ 
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activists. There are some people who are not interested in politics at all, but have an anti-
German attitude. They associate RAS with some form of Germanness, which is nonsense.’ 
[M.K.] 
One of the interviewees pointed out another area which is influenced by the nationwide media – – 
Poles abroad, who often crave for their homeland, read the news and are swayed by the mainstream 
discourse about Polish integrity: 
‘My other uncle, living in Sweden, came across some news on SONS on the internet, on the 
‘Rzeczpospolita’ web site, which is known for supporting a radical right- wing world-view – my 
uncle was scared by an unfavourable opinion about the association. He wrote an email in which 
he condemned my activity in SONS, he believed that our ancestors – Polish patriots – are 
'rolling over in their graves' when looking at my actions. He asked me, if we wanted to establish 
a new state in Silesia. It is thus not surprising for me that people reading newspapers, with no 
knowledge of the Silesian reality, interpret it this way. They read the article, get frightened and 
then (just) react. Newspapers write that we are sponsored by Angela Merkel in order to create 
the next German province. I’ve written 15 pages in order to explain him step by step who we 
are’. [W.G.] 
The media reinforce the negative, black-and-white picture of these minority organisations. They prey 
on and thrive on local conflicts. In order to attract readers, journalists radicalise the issue, give a 
simplified and screwed picture of the minorities' requests, and blur the significance of cultural 
differences. The case of Silesians and RAS shows that the public debate on cultural diversity 
resembles a squabble rather than a public debate. 
A categorical and simplifying media coverage suits many regional politicians’ views and  RAS and 
SONS are seen by them as a threat:  
‘SONS is seen as another group that wants to exist politically. [There is] competition in the 
market. (…) Because suddenly there is something [an organization] that Silesians needed for a 
long time and politicians are well aware that Silesians were waiting for it, so the fear is that if 
we organize ourselves  and begin to form a compact group, there may arise a political force 
that somehow curtails the electorate. And the second thing is the traditional Polish vs. German 
political division in the Opole Province. (…) There used to be a clear division in this province – 
The German minority and the rest. During political campaigns, debates usually focused either 
on the monuments or bilingual names. Economics, and other matters were absent. And suddenly 
this relative balance was shattered. I think politicians got scared that easy victories in elections 
are over, because Silesians appeared on the political scene  and they are not easily qualified in 
the German-Polish division. I think it is one of the reasons of these sharp responses to what is 
going on.’ [P.D.] 
The debate is also animated by prejudices against and competition with the German minority, which is 
considered the most powerful and the most well-organised . 
‘Law and Justice's statement on Silesians was overblown by the media. Its concern was RAS's 
activity, because it is seen as a German-sponsored and inspired organisation, thus it is evil. Just 
read the internet forums of Polish Silesia or the Sovereignty Defense League. (…) It was 
generally  favourable to us, Silesians. Silesians were mobilised by it, they felt their identity. 
Over the years the choice was: either you are a German, or  a Pole. Now it is changing.’ 
[W.G.] 
The hostility towards RAS can overshadow the most conspicuous political divisions. In the Katowice 
district, there is a coalition of PiS with its traditional archenemy, the Democratic Left Alliance, which 
is still considered a post-communist party. Its aim  is to oppose, at least according to our interlocutor 
M.K., RAS. 
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The long-term program of RAS can be summarised as follows: 
‘It is the desire to change the functioning of the Polish state, through greater empowerment of 
the regions, and the regional and local authorities, not only in Silesia, but it is a postulate which 
we would like to extend to other regions.(...)In order to make such changes, amendments in the 
Constitution are necessary. It requires a general, nationwide civic consensus. Therefore, in the 
next few years we aim to create a new party of regions (not to be confused with the Party of 
Regions created by Andrzej Lepper -  I do not know if it still exists). This party  would be a 
federation of regional parties in Poland. In this regard, we count on, for example, the Union of 
Wielkopolska [Great Poland or Poznania]. (…) I noticed that in other parts of Poland 
organisations that are inspired by us are formed. Podlasie has the Movement for Podlasie 
Autonomy, the Masurian Autonomy Movement
26
. For us, the most important thing is the 
increase of political support and the local reception of RAS in Silesia. In the past, it was 
associated with local folklore, provocative actions of some kind, and the Fifth Column. Now it is 
different.’ [M.K.] 
The main source of conflict incited by RAS’s  activists and their increasing success and popularity is 
the attempt to redefine the notion of nation , an endeavour to shift its meaning from ethnic to civic, 
from ethnos to. demos (Szacki 2000: 280-285). 
One of the interviewees expresses it boldly: 
‘Therefore, it is stated in our constitution, every citizen in Poland has Polish nationality. And in 
the context of citizenship, we are Polish citizens. But our identity – this is something different. 
For me,  it is similar to the Spanish example – the Spanish Constitution says that  a civic nation 
consists of  regional nations. This is an awesome solution. A federal model, respecting ethnic or 
regional groups with  regional identity. This is a very well-weighted approach to nationality. 
The Polish constitution would have to be reformulated to establish a new federal state.’ 
[W.G.]
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7.3.  The Silesian Autonomy Movement & Silesians in public space 
According to the specificity of the Polish political scene presented above, the arrangement of local 
political forces results in a paradoxical marginalisation of RAS and SONS in the media – the 
organisations are a contentious issue engaging the majority of politicians and some citizens, but as 
RAS is not a significant political force nationwide and has no representation in Parliament, it is rather 
being discussed than discusses with others: 
‘The problem is, even if it looks nice, the members of RAS are young. This means that their 
spare time begins after 6 p.m., when we all finish work. It looks good , but it creates logistical 
problems. But we are trying to be visible, to appear in various debates as participants. 
However, more often we [the Silesians and RAS members] appear as a subject of the 
discussion, because, for example, political parties and leaders in the Parliament speak about us 
without our presence. (…) There is a weekly Sunday political broadcast on the Opole Radio 
where only the representatives of parliamentary parties can actively participate. We are never 
invited to this broadcast although Silesians or RAS are their main topic [of discussion] every 
other Sunday. So, much is said about us without us.(…) We are trying to change this situation. 
We  do not protest, rather we comment on it – recently, we issued a statement postulating the 
organisation of debates with our participation. All Poles debate about Silesian nationality, but 
hardly ever people identifying themselves as Silesians are involved in the debate. There are 
                                                     
26 http://gazetaolsztynska.pl/69294,Powstal-Ruch-Autonomii-Mazur.html 
27 Actually, and as mentioned above, in the preamble to the Polish Constitution, an ambiguous and compromising statement 
was accepted: ‘We, the Polish Nation - all citizens of the Republic.’ 
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some interesting concepts discussed, but without us. We proposed to organise a debate between 
scientists on the Silesian identity because there are some scholars in Warsaw, Cracow and 
Wroclaw who have investigated the subject, and I would prefer that we talked to them rather 
than fight with the joint right-wing option [Law and Justice and Solidary Poland] flipping their 
radical interpretations and ideas about us.’ [P.D.] 
This marginalisation involves two levels of discussion: 1. it blocks other viewpoints in the discussion 
by excluding the counterarguments of those interested;2. it exemplifies the fact that in Polish politics, 
those undermining the existing political order and its nationalist background (cultural hegemony) are 
estranged. Participants and ordinary people are concerned with political conflicts within the existing 
conceptual framework and they principally reject any attempts at its redefinition. RAS is a perfect 
object of attack for rightist supporters, but cannot appear as a real partner in discussions. Such a 
hostile attitude strengthens self-identification within the existing dominant order:  
‘The problem is this: either we have weak representatives and weak politicians, or people do 
not want fundamental conversations. (...) People want easy recipes.’ [M.K.] 
As mentioned earlier, there were attempts at a scientific reflection on the identity of  Silesians and the 
future of RAS’s aspirations, but they always triggered emotional debates, which as yet have no 
meaningful conclusions. The 2012 Census was the Silesians’ success, though it may change the 
situation and force politicians and sociologists/political scientists to reconsider the issue of Silesia and 
Silesians. 
And finally, an anecdote which illustrates the struggles of Silesians (both their methods and 
motivations) with the established cultural and political order. 
‘Last  Saturday we had another happening. President Komorowski, at the opening of the spring 
season in the Music Academy, tossed a  bon mot ‘ let’s bury Brynica in our minds’a – Brynica is 
a border river between Silesia  and Małopolska [Cracovia],  and before  WWI, it was a border 
between  the Prussian and Russian partitions . So we decided that it was a great opportunity to 
organise a happening. We [the Katowice Circle of RAS] called up the guys, took the truck with 
debris, shovels, and organised a ‘sobotnik’[a Russian term for ‘voluntary work for the 
community on Saturdays, practiced in the communist times] – burying Brynica. Of course, we 
didn't actually throw the debris into the river, but it was a funny event. But Komorowski’s bon 
mot has a curious undertone: let’s bury all differences, let's all be the same [i.e. Poles, the 
nation].’ [M.K.] 
 8. Conclusions 
 Local elections in Silesia and wrangling in the region cause nationwide interest and a sense of 
an endangerment of the nation. Seen even form this point of view, such fears are unjustified, 
because RAS is a marginal political organisation with still little political power in Silesia. Its 
chances for growth in size and power are limited since ‘indigenous’ Silesians , or those ready 
to self-identify as Silesians, comprise a minority in the region. The issue of discussion over 
RAS and the controversies around its members’ opinions  signal unresolved tensions that arise 
in mutual relations between central authorities and local movements or even governments. The 
view, expressed by some politicians, that Silesians should accept general political principles 
and remain invisible in the public, confirm Silesians' expectations of  compensation  for their 
suffering and the restoration of the importance of their region. ‘Silesian harm’ and the feeling 
of threat coming from the Polish state – the coloniser – is not absent. Some respondents in this 
study and elsewhere (see: Sekuła 2009: 407) show concerns associated with the use and 
presentation of their opinions expressed during the interviews. 
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 The hardships in Silesia after WWII has not been acknowledged. It deepens the feeling of 
being disregarded and of a lack of respect. This contributes to the discourse of conflict 
between the ‘gentlemen from Warsaw' and ‘Silesian people.' No doubt, it negatively affects 
the mutual understanding and cooperation between the regional activists and central 
authorities. 
 Due to their effectiveness, modern activity strategies  applied by RAS and SONS are emulated 
by other political forces in the region. It may happen that the Silesians will pluralise Polish 
political life without necessarily achieving their own goals. 
  Limiting access of minorities to public debates and restricting their political participation 
demonstrates a general lack of support (i.e., non-acceptance and non-recognition) of the 
minorities’ efforts to participate in public life as equal partners (e.g., the accusation that RAS 
abuses preferential democratic rules designed to promote actual ethnic minorities, like the 
Germans). 
 The situation of Silesians differs from that of the ‘recognised minorities’, such as, Germans or 
Roma. However, this argument is only partially valid, since, in fact, these official minorities 
also play a negligible role in political life, and they remain marginal players despite their legal 
recognition. The process of the formation of these minorities'  organisations and the modes of 
their participation in the public life are subjected to negotiation, but the importance of these 
issues for the dominant society is limited. 
 So far, there is a lack of tolerance at the state level and a partial tolerance at the local level 
towards the identity-based activity of Silesians and its political manifestations. But support for 
RAS in the region is narrow, which backs up our thesis from our previous studies (Buchowski 
and Chlewińska 2010; 2011), that Polish society conceives itself as a homogeneous ethnic 
entity, a unified and integral nation. Public discourse favours patriotic and national 
perspectives and there is no room for the equal participation of minorities in public life, or, at 
least, any leeway is constricted for them and it is defined by the dominant majority. 
 Gerd Baumann (2004) distinguishes three grammars of identity. One of them is ‘the grammar 
of encompassment’, in which ‘the putatively subordinate category is adopted, subsumed or co-
opted into the identity (…) and owned by those who do encompassing. Encompassing is thus 
always hierarchical’ (Baumann 2004: 26). It seems that the case of Silesians represents this 
kind of logic. Although they want to emancipate, they are told that they are Poles. Perhaps, it 
is the function of the logic of integral nationalism that strives to encompass all diversities and 
to subsume them to the dominant group. 
 In this context the notion hierarchical pluralism also comes to mind. As Agnieszka Pasieka, 
who studied the religious hierarchical order in a local community in Southern Poland defines 
it, it is ‘a configuration of social relations which allows plurality while at the same time 
establishing one (ethnic/religious) group as dominant and norm-defining. In other words (…), 
[it is] a situation in which declared equality serves to mask factual inequality’ (Pasieka 2012: 
25). The Polish majority not only puts itself in this position of defining the standards, but it 
also fiercely defends any attempts at redefining the existing power relations and hierarchy. 
They are closely related to the dominant cultural scheme (sort of Pierre Bourdieu’s doxa)in 
which the majority defines the understanding of tolerance and sets the norms for what is 
tolerance, and last but not least, what can be tolerated.   
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Anex I  
 
List of interviewees  
 
 Interviews were recorded and transcribed in Polish. 
 
[P.D.] – male, SONS board member, a longtime RAS activist (currently works only in SONS),  runs a 
website selling merchandise related to Silesia, often present in the columns of newspapers and in the 
media [January 2012]  
 
[W.G.] – male,young  member of SONS in Opole, member of a family engaged in promoting Silesian 
culture  [January 2012] 
 
[M.K.] – male, chairman of RAS circle in Katowice, declared Silesian, legal education, present in the 
media – he is also a spokesperson of RAS in Katowice [February 2012] 
 
[M. Kl.] –male,  member of RAS circle in Katowice, declared Silesian, active participant of RAS 
initiatives, IT specialist [February 2012] 
 
 
 
 
Anex II 
 
Interview-guide for semi-structured interviews (list of issues) 
 
Part A (general information) 
 
1. Personal information – name, occupation, specificity of the connection to RAS, SONS or any 
other Silesian organisation, role in the organisation. 
2. Personal identification. 
3. Family history. 
4. Motivation of organisational activity. 
5. Previous experience in organisations promoting Silesian identity. 
6. Personal experiences of contacts members of other organisations and minorities (mainly 
Germans). 
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7. General opinion on the situation of Silesia/Silesians in Poland. 
8. General opinion about political system and Silesians’ place in it. 
 
Part B 
 
1. General opinion about state policies on minorities. 
2. Opinion on state policies and attitudes towards the Silesians and their organisations. 
3. Main challenges faced by Silesians’ organisations in political life. 
4. Examples of good/bad practices in cooperation with local/national governments. 
5. Memorable episodes, events related to work in the organisation. 
6. Memorable episodes, events related to the ‘camouflaged German option’ controversy. 
7. Main challenges in cooperation with local officials. 
8. Main concerns related to the future of Silesia, Silesians and organisations promoting Silesian 
culture and presence in political life. 
9. Diagnosis of the most pressing problems in political life in Poland. 
10. Proposals of solutions to the most severe problems. 
11. General opinion on tolerance towards minorities in Poland. 
12. General opinion on tolerance towards Silesians and their place in Polish political/legal system. 
13. Personal meaning of the term ‘tolerance’ and opinion on the limits of tolerance towards 
minorities/Silesians in Poland. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
